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HORSE SENSE AND THE UCC: THE
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INTRODUCTION
Less than two percent of all horses ultimately become stakes winners.'
Forty percent of the thoroughbreds ultimately win at least one race,2 and
sixty-five percent of the thoroughbreds at least make it to the starting gate.3
But approximately thirty-five percent of each year's crop of thoroughbred
foals never make it to the track.4 Therefore, the purchase of a horse for
racing purposes is a transaction that involves significant financial risk.
Those who compete in the sport of horse racing as owners must either
breed or buy their equine athletes.5 For those who choose to try to breed a
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1. J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, Successful Thoroughbred Investment in a Changing
Market 203 (1984). Stakes races are the highest class of race in any racing jurisdiction, and usu-
ally involve the largest purses. Id. at 219-20. For example, "[w]hile stakes races represented only
3.5% of all the races run in North America during 1983, the purses they carried represented 21%
of all the money earned by horses running that year." Id. at 43.
2. The 1985 thoroughbred foal crop, which is now six years old, consisted of 50,438 horses.
As of January 1, 1990, 20,405, or 40.4% of the 50,438 foals had won a race. Splitting out the
statistics for colts and fillies, 11,090, or 45.2% of the colts ended up winning a race. Telephone
interview with The Jockey Club, Lexington, Kentucky (February 6, 1990). The overall percent-
ages do not fluctuate significantly from year to year. Id.
3. Of the 50,438 thoroughbred foals of 1985, 33,022 had started in a race as of January 1,
1990. Id. Although there were a few more fillies (25,493) than colts (24,945) in the 1985 thor-
oughbred crop, 16,963 (69.2%) of the colts made it to the starting gate, but only 16,059 (62.9%)
of the fillies did so. Id.
4. The fact that 17,416 of the thoroughbred horses foaled in 1985 had not started a race as of
January 1, 1990 is not altogether surprising. Any number of ailments or injuries can befall a
young horse and render it unsuitable for racing during the 2 1/2 years from its birth to the point
when it would typically start to race. See LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 55.
5. Breeding horses to race "can be the most rewarding form of participation in the business,
but it also is the most expensive and requires the most patience." Id. at 203. This article includes
a discussion of some of the cases in which the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has been applied
to the sale of various types of equine breeding rights, but horse breeding involves a number of legal
issues that are outside the scope of this article. For a discussion of some of the legal problems that
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winner, the acquisition of the proper combination of interests in stallions6
and broodmares 7 is a subtle blend of art, science and alchemy. Others at-
tempt a more direct approach: the purchase of a future champion at a pub-
lic' or private sale.9 In either event, the peculiarities and customs of the.
come up in the breeding context, see Kropp, Landen & Donath, The Prevention and Treatment of
Breeding Contract Controversies, 74 KY. L.J. 715 (1985-86).
6. A "stallion" is a "male horse used for the purpose of breeding." J. LOHMAN & A. KIRK-
PATRICK, supra note 1, at 220. The term has a meaning distinct from the word "colt," which
refers to "[a] male thoroughbred horse (other than a gelding or ridgeling) which has not reached
its fifth birth date or has not been bred." Id. at 212. A gelding is a male horse that has been
castrated, and a ridgeling is a male horse with only one descended testicle. Id. at 214, 218.
7. A "broodmare" is "a [flemale thoroughbred used for breeding." Id. at 211. A "mare" is a
"[flemale thoroughbred five years old or older, or younger if she has been bred." Id. at 216.
Conversely, a female horse that is not yet five years old, and which has not been bred, is a "filly."
Id. at 213.
8. The terms "public sale" and "public proceedings" have specific legal meanings under the
UCC and under the body of commercial law that developed before the advent of the UCC. See,
e.g., UCC § 9-504(3) ("public proceedings"); UCC § 9-504 comment 1 (describing the use of the
terms "public" and "private" sale under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act). The legal meaning of "public sale" in some states is similar to, but not necessar-
ily synonymous with, the term "auction." For example, in Ohio a "public sale" requires publicity,
competitive bidding, and an invitation to the public. See Liberty National Bank of Fremont v.
Greiner, 62 Ohio App. 2d 125, 405 N.E.2d 317 (1978). The term "auction" is statutorily defined
in Ohio as:
a sale of real or personal property, goods or chattels by means of verbal exchange or physi-
cal gesture between an auctioneer or apprentice auctioneer and members of his audience,
the exchanges and gestures consisting of a series of invitations for offers made by the auc-
tioneer and offers by the members of the audience, with the right to acceptance of offers
with the auctioneer or apprentice auctioneer.
OHIO REv. CODE Ann. § 4707.01(A)(Page 1987). These definitions are similar, but not necessar-
ily coextensive.
In the horse business, the term "public sale" has a specific meaning as a matter of custom and
usage, distinct from its legal meaning. The industry uses a series of public sales, usually con-
ducted at given times of year, by given sales companies, in given locations, as a recognized market
for the sale of weanlings, yearlings, two-year-olds and broodmares. For example, in 1990 there
were over 95 such sales in North America. See Auctions of 1990, THE BLOOD-HORSE 22 (Special
Issue, Jan. 12, 1991) [hereinafter referred to as AUCTIONS OF 1990]. These events are often re-
ferred to by those in the business as "public sales" or, simply "the sales." These sales are usually
conducted pursuant to a set of published "terms and conditions of sale," which can have a
profound influence on the outcome of any dispute between the seller and the buyer. For a discus-
sion of the purchase of horses at public sales, see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
In light of the differences between the legal and customary definitions, the context of its use
may be the only way to determine if a term such as "public sale" is being used in its legal sense or
in its customary sense within the horse industry. As used in this article, unless the context other-
wise requires, the term "public sale" is used in its customary sense in the horse business.
9. Although roughly one fifth to one quarter of each year's foal crop may go through a public
sale as yearlings in any given year, race horse sales transactions are face to face negotiations
between sellers and buyers. See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 78; AUCTIONS
OF 1990, supra note 8, at 11. Horses can also be purchased by "claiming" them at the track, when
they run in claiming races.
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horse business, when combined with the amounts of money involved in
these transactions, can result in complex legal issues and hard fought
disputes.10
The days of handshake deals in the horse business are rapidly coming to
an end. This article is an introduction to the legal rights and liabilities that
arise in the purchase and sale of what many consider to be the fastest com-
petitors' 1 in sports: thoroughbred and standardbred racehorses. 12
II. THE SALES TRANSACTION: APPLICATION OF UCC ARTICLE 2
A. Does Article 2 Apply?
Article 2 of the UCC applies only to "transactions in goods."' 3 As a
threshold matter, it is necessary to determine whether the items sold in the
10. Custom and usage play a "varied and powerful" role in the horse industry. Miller,
America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in the Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 Ky. L.J.
781 (1985-86). Miller's thought-provoking article asks the question: "Is there a meaningful, iden-
tifiable body of American 'equine law'-a separate voice, apart from all of the others, singing
different words and tunes?" Id. at 781. As Miller concludes, "there are some areas of law in
which the court has no choice but to look to the customs and usages that surround the transaction
before it.... [I]n a broad range of fact situations, there is no reason that society cannot permit a
colorful business to indulge its fanciful habits, recognizing the common acceptance of bizarre risks
with consistent expressions of honor." Id. at 837.
11. On March 5, 1983, Cris Collinsworth, the All-Pro wide receiver of the Cincinnati Ben-
gals, ran a race at Latonia Race Course (now known as Turfway Park) against a 7-year-old thor-
oughbred race horse called MR. HURRY. See Cincinnati Enquirer, March 6, 1983, at D-14, col.
2. MR. HURRY had not made it to the winner's circle at Latonia in 108 tries, so the crowd
hoped for a good race between an excellent human athlete and a thoroughbred that had "signed a
futures contract with the glue factory." Id. But MR. HURRY beat Collinsworth by three
lengths, and was pulling away. In Collinsworth's own words, "Even with my nose I couldn't win
by a nose." Id. A superior human athlete can run 100 meters in a little less than 10 seconds, at a
speed of approximately 22 1/2 miles per hour (m.p.h.). See 1990-91 Guiness Sports Record Book
207 (1990). At a distance of a mile, the fastest human time is in the range of 3 minutes and 47
seconds, or about 16 m.p.h. See id. The winning time in the Kentucky Derby, a ran of 1 1/4
miles (a little over 2000 meters), averages about 2 minutes and 2 seconds, which works out to a
speed of almost 37 m.p.h. See, eg., Cincinnati Enquirer, May 6, 1990, at C-13 (results of 1990
Kentucky Derby). Thus, the outcome of the 41 yard race between Collinsworth and MR.
HURRY was neither surprising, nor a negative reflection on Collinsworth's considerable abilities.
12. This article focuses on thoroughbred and standardbred horses, but many of the legal
principles described apply with equal force to the purchase and sale of other breeds of horse, such
as Arabians. Although Arabian racing is a growing sport, thoroughbreds and standardbreds are
still perceived by the public as "racehorses" and Arabians are still usually considered "show hor-
ses." The breed of a horse may have an impact on the "ordinary purpose" and the "particular
purpose" for which it is purchased, within the meaning of UCC § 2-315. For a discussion of
ordinary and particular purposes, see infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
13. UCC § 2-102. When reference is made to the Uniform Commerical Code (UCC), the
reference is to the 1972 version unless otherwise noted.
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horse business are considered "goods" thus triggering application of Article
2 of the UCC.
The purchase and sale of any item at prices in excess of $1,000,000
quickly captures the public's attention.14 This attention is only heightened
when the sale involves a beautiful commodity such as a thoroughbred
racehorse, which has a potential for earning millions of dollars at the
track.'5 While the excitement of a horse sale provides a glamorous image of
the items being sold, it is important to remember that horses, from the mo-
ment of birth, are clearly "goods" within the meaning of the UCC. 16
Therefore, from foaling to death and beyond, the sale of horses is governed
by Article 2 of the UCC.17
It is also common in the horse industry to sell partial interests (com-
monly referred to as "shares") in a horse to a number of parties pursuant to
a syndicate arrangement. 8 In North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, 9 for
14. The top 16 yearling prices at the sales in 1990 were a million dollars or more. AUCTIONS
OF 1990, supra note 8, at 13. A colt by SEATTLE SLEW out of WEEKEND SUPRISE, sold for
$2,900,000. Id. at 16.
15. The price structure of the industry would be very difficult to justify absent the promise of
tremendous potential racing purses. The purse distribution for 1989 was approximately
$750,000,000. Auctions of 1989, The Blood-House 15 (Special Issue, Jan. 13, 1990). Purses rose
dramatically during the 1980s (from $451,195,968 at the beginning of the decade). Id. This was
led in part by the Breeders Cup program and various state programs which enhance the purses for
races restricted to horses bred in that state. See, e.g., J. LOHMAN & A. KiRKPATRICK, supra note
1, at 167-83 (a description of various types of state-bred programs).
16. See, e.g., Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)("The sale of a horse is
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code covering the sales of goods."). Goods are defined in
§ 2-105 of the UCC as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action." For a discussion of the classification
of various types of interests in horses for Article 9 purposes, see infra notes 187-97 and accompa-
nying text.
17. See, e.g., Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986)(dispute over purchase of
Russian-Arabian stallion); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 568 F.2d 770
(3d Cir. 1978)(dispute over purchase of standardbred racehorse); Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp.
1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976)(dispute over purchase of thoroughbred racehorse at a horse auction);
Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 399 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965)(dispute over purchase of racehorse); Reyn-
olds, Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton: A Caveat to the Horse Trader, 74 KY. L.J. 889 (1985-86)(a general
discussion of UCC principles in light of the Chernick decision).
Under UCC § 2-105 "young of animals are also included expressly in this definition since they,
too, are frequently intended for sale and may be contracted for before birth. The period of gesta-
tion of domestic animals is such that the provisions of the section on identification can apply as in
the case of crops to be planted." UCC § 2-105 comment 1. Thus, from the moment of concep-
tion, foals are also goods within the scope of Article 2 of the UCC.
18. In Stratmore v. Goodbody, 866 R.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1989), investors purchased forty
undivided shares of Shareef Dancer, a thoroughbred stallion, for $1,000,000 per share under a
syndication agreement. "Each share entitles a member of the syndicate to breed a mare with
Sahreef DAnceer every season over the stallion's life." Id. UCC § 2-105(3) provides that "[t]here
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example, the owner of the thoroughbred stallion AFFIRMED, the last
Triple Crown winner, divided and sold the horse in thirty-six equal and
undivided shares.20 In order to resolve the competing claims of secured
creditors in one of the fractional shares of the horse, the North Ridge court
held that each fractional interest in the horse qualified as a good for UCC
purposes.21 The fact that the syndicate arrangement for AFFIRMED con-
veyed undivided interests in the horse and categorized the owners of the
fractional shares as tenants in common satisfied the North Ridge court that
each of the fractional interests constituted goods for UCC purposes.22
The horse industry deals not only in the sale of horses, shares and foals
in utero, but also in the sale of breeding rights or seasons.23 The manner in
which the sale of a breeding right is accomplished often dictates the applica-
bility of Article 2 to the transaction.24 Depending on the nature of the
transaction, a breeding right may be characterized as a good 25 or a general
intangible26 for UCC purposes.2 7 Moreover, a breeding season could be
may be a sale of a part interest in existing identifed goods." Courts typically recognize, but do not
completely rely upon, UCC § 2-105(3) when analyzing fractional interests in horses sold pursuant
to a syndicate arrangement. See, eg., North Ridge Farms, Inc., v. Trimble, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1280, 1286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)(officially unreported), aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985)(without
comment on the lower court's classification of the collateral).
19. 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280, 1286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)(officially unreported),
aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985).
20. Id. at 1283. Each fractional share sold for $400,000. Id. The purchase and sale of frac-
tional interests also gives rise to a host of securities issues. See Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as
Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82).
21. North Ridge 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1286-87; see also Guggenheim, v. Commissioner 46
T.C. 559 (1966)(sale of a share in a thoroughbred stallion held to be a sale of an actual undivided
interest in the horse and not an intangible).
22. North Ridge, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1287. The court cautioned, however, that "every
syndicate agreement must be considered individually when analyzing Code definitions." Id. at
1288. If additional rights in excess of and separate from the undivided interests in the horse are
transferred in a syndicate arrangement, the interest conveyed may be considered goods, contract
rights, general intangibles or a combination thereof. Id. For a further discussion of the character-
ization of syndicate shares for Article 9 purposes, see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
23. In the case of non-thoroughbred breeds, the term "breeding right" is more frequently
used. A breeding right is "the right to breed one mare to one stallion for one or more breeding
seasons, generally not including an ownership interest in the stallion." J. LOHMAN & A. KIRK-
PATRICK, supra note 1, at 211. In the thoroughbred business, a "season" or "stallion season" is a
one time, non-recurring right to breed a mare to a particular stallion. Id. at 220.
24. See generally Kropp, Landen and Donath, supra note 5, at 718.
25. See, eg., In re Blankinship-Cooper, Inc., 43 B.R. 231, 236-37 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
26. See, e.g., Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse, 41 Wash. App. 142, 702 P.2d 1226, 1228 (1985)(not-
ing that "[s]perm inside a stallion ... is not readily separable, nor able to be packaged," and that
breeding rights are therefore not goods).
27. Currently, many of the decisions impacting and discussing this area seem to be arising
under Aricle 9 of the UCC, without direct comment on the potentially far-reaching implications
of their decisions on the treatment of the sales of breeding seasons under Article 2 or under the
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considered, at least theoretically, a "mixed bag" transaction of goods and
services: The semen itself as goods and the use of the horse incident to the
breeding as services. Courts generally determine the applicability of Article
2 to transactions involving a mixed bag of goods and services by determin-
ing which factor predominates. z8
B. Offer and Acceptance: Private Sales and Auctions
The principles of offer and acceptance under the UCC, as set forth in
Part 2 of Article 2, apply to all sales of "goods" within the horse industry.29
Given the nature of the goods in the horse industry, however, the statute of
frauds provisions are frequently encountered and are particularly worthy of
discussion. All significant equine transactions obviously exceed the $500.00
minimum threshold and thus such transactions are subject to the statute of
frauds requirement under the UCC.3 ° Unless the equine transaction falls
within one of the exceptions noted within section 2-201 of the UCC, a con-
tract for the sale of a horse will be enforceable only if it is in writing and
signed by the party against whom the enforcement is sought.
Section 2-201(2) of the UCC provides that a confirmatory memorandum
or letter without the signature of the party against whom enforcement is
sought will satisfy the statute of frauds requirements if the transaction is
between "merchants" and the memorandum or letter is not timely objected
to in writing.31 Although a seller or purchaser of horses could theoretically
common law of contracts. For a discussion of classification of equine collateral under Article 9,
see infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text
28. See, eg., J.S. McHugh, Inc. v. Capolino, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977); 2A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 476 (1950). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-2 (3d ed. 1988).
29. For a discussion of which types of interests in horses are considered to be goods, see supra
notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
30. UCC § 2-201(1) provides that "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or
more is not enforceable... unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought ...."
31. UCC § 2-104 defines "merchant" as a
"person who deals in goods of the kind or otherrwise by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out has having such
knowledge or skill."
In addition to formal discovery, there are several published sources that may be of assistance in
determining if someone is a merchant in horses. See, e.g., AuCriONS OF 1990, supra note 8, at 14
(listing approximately 150 "leading yearling buyers" and how many horses they bought in 1990).
See generally Annotation, Farmers As "Merchants" Within Provisions of UCC Article 2, Dealing
with Sales, 95 A.L.R.3d 484 (1979 & Supp. 1989). Note that it is theoretically possible to be a
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be a non-merchant if his or her equine transactions are few and far between,
most people active in the horse industry will be considered to be merchants
as defined in the UCC.32
Section 2-201(3) of the UCC contains several other exceptions to the
general requirement that a contract for the sale of goods in excess of
$500.00 must be in writing; however, the exception that is usually most
relevant to horse transactions is provided -under UCC section 2-201(3)(c).
Under this exception, a contract that otherwise violates the statute of frauds
provisions will nevertheless be enforceable if either the payment or the
goods have been received and accepted by a party to the transaction. Thus,
although a purely oral contract for the sale of a horse generally will not be
enforceable before delivery or payment, both the seller and the purchaser
will be bound after one of them performs without the other's objection.33
Public sales are an important part of the horse industry and typically
involve the transfer of very valuable horses.34 Public sales are Article 2
sales of goods just like privately negotiated sales; however public sales use
an auction format.3 ' Therefore, at public sales, the provisions of the UCC
are supplemented by the laws of auctions in each state because the UCC
does not specifically displace separate bodies of law such as the law applica-
merchant of one breed or type of horse, but not of other breeds or types, depending on the pattern
of transactions. See UCC § 2-104(l) & comment 2 (merchant status as to any parricular transac-
tion "requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods"). It is also possible that many
people who individually know little about horse racing become "merchants" through their use of
a trainer or bloodstock agent.
32. See, e.g., Alpert, 643 F. Supp. at 1415-16 (seller a merchant of Russian-Arabian horses);
Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 769 (seller of racehorse was a merchant).
33. See UCC § 2-20 comment 2. It is common for courts to enforce oral contracts that would
otherwise violate the statute of frauds, by citing the UCC § 2-201(3)(a) exception, but without a
specific discussion of the issue. See, eg., Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 764; Strauss v. West, 100 R.I. 388,
216 A.2d 366, 367 (R.I. 1966). But see Presti, 348 F. Supp. at 543 (unsuccessful attempt by a
party to enforce an oral contract for purchase of a horse because of failure to prove acceptance of
the check).
34. The sales gross for thoroughbred yearlings sold at public sales in 1989 was $257,342,967,
with an average price of $29,377. AUCTIONS OF 1990, supra note 8, at 11. The peak year for
thoroughbred yearlings at "the sales" was 1984, when the sales gross was $383,659,326 with an
average price of $41,396. Id. The average prices at the "summer sales," where some of the best
yearlings are sold, are usually substantially higher than the average. In 1989, the "summer sales"
for yearlings averaged $344,846 for each of the 383 yearlings sold. Id. Although public sale
yearling prices are a commonly used barometer for the thoroughbred industry, they are only a
part of the thoroughbred public sale market. See, eg., id. at 145 (in 1990, 3,789 two-year-olds
sold for an average of $20,315); id. at 122 (in 1989, 1,565 weanlings sold for an average of
$18,151).
35. For a general discussion of public sales and auctions, see supra note 8 and accompanying
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ble to auctions. 6 Thus, one must look at both the special UCC provision
pertaining to auctions3 7 and the applicable state law outside of the UCC to
resolve many of the issues concerning contract formation at an auction
sale.3 8
An auction sale of a horse is also different from a private sale because
the seller and buyer do not necessarily meet, the price is set by competitive
bidding and the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties
are customarily established by the auction company in its "Conditions of
Sale" printed in the sales catalog. 39 The Conditions of Sale typically supply
all of the terms and conditions that would otherwise be included in a writ-
ten sales contract, including but not limited to the warranty and warranty
disclaimer provisions.'
As a final point about horse auctions, it should be noted that a third
party is introduced into the sales transaction: the auctioneer. An auction-
eer, although generally not considered a party to the sales contract, may be
liable for any negligent or fraudulent acts that he or she commits or
facilitates.4"
36. UCC § 1-103 provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
37. The UCC Article 2 provision that specifically addresses auctions is § 2-328. A key provi-
sion within this section provides that a
sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the hammer or
in any other customary manner. Where a bid is made while the hammer is falling in
acceptance of a prior bid the auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding or declare
the goods sold under the bid on which the hammer was falling.
UCC § 2-328(2). The balance of the subsections of UCC § 2-328 deal with certain aspects of
reserved bidding and the like.
38. For a discussion of some of the legal and practical factors that distinguish equine auctions
from privately negotiated sales transaction, see Miller, The Auction, Exchange and Non-Private
Sale of Horses and Interests in Horses, Seminar on Equine Law, May 1, 1986, University of Ken-
tucky College of Law.
39. The "conditions of sale" printed in the sales catalog are incorporated by reference into the
contract formed by the bidding. The conditions of sale are usually quite lengthy.
40. But see Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 47 Wash. App. 361, 734 P.2d 956,
958 (1987), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d 418 (1988)(finding that "[t]he
disclaimer of implied warranties in the sales catalog was invalid because it was not explicitly
negotiated between the buyer and the seller"). The Washington Supreme Court allayed the fears
of many in the horse industry by reversing part of the lower court's analysis that could have been
devastating to the use of public sales.
41. See Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885, 889-90 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986)(the Kentucky Court of Appeals suggests that even though the auctioneer was not a party to
the sales contract, he or she may be liable if negligent or a participant in a fraud). For a discussion
of the Chernick case, see Reynolds, supra note 17, at 904-18.
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C. Terms of the Sales Agreement
Once the existence of a valid and binding contract for the sale of a horse
is established, the terms and conditions of the relevant sales documentation
can be interpreted under UCC principles. As in any contract situation, ide-
ally the parties will agree to all of the terms of the sale and will clearly
express their agreement in writing.42 In a privately negotiated sales transac-
tion for a horse, the terms and conditions of the sale are typically contained
in two or three documents: a purchase and sales agreement, a promissory
note and a security agreement.43 To help avoid future conflicts between the
buyer and seller, certain information should be included, at an absolute
minimum, within the purchase agreement. The name and address of both
the seller and the buyer and a description of the horse should be included.'
In addition, the price, time of payment, manner of payment and, if applica-
ble, the interest rate on any outstanding balance should be detailed. The
agreement should, of course, be signed by both parties. Most horsemen
who negotiate private contracts seem to accomplish all of the foregoing
without difficulty; unfortunately, they often stop there and do not include
other clauses that could be the source of significant friction later.
For example, the purchase contract should also provide a description of
the location and time of delivery of the horse, including a specific descrip-
tion of the transportation method and payment responsibilities. A variety
of other important clauses are also frequently omitted, such as allocation of
the risk of loss, insurance obligations, representations regarding the horse's
lien status, an integration clause, and a choice of law provision. The other
42. If a single writing contains all of the terms and conditions relied upon by both parties, it is
easier for the court to find a meeting of the minds. UCC § 2-207, however, deals with the problem
of conflicting written terms, as where the buyer's purchase order contains one set of terms and the
seller's confirmation contains another set of terms. This scenario is also known as the "battle of
the forms." The purchase order/confirmation scenario is not common in the horse industry.
Nevertheless, UCC § 2-207 can be very significant in those cases where there are a series of letters
leading up to a privately negotiated sale. In analyzing a deal after the fact, when there is appar-
ently no written contract, one must pay particular attention to the contents of any pre-sale corre-
spondence. The letters and notes between the parties may, when taken together, constitute a
"hidden" contract. For a very good explanation of the battle of the forms and UCC § 2-207, see
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 1-3.
43. For a discussion of security agreements in the horse business, see infra notes 173-84 and
accompanying text.
44. The description of a horse should be as complete as possible and include its breed, sire,
dam, sire of dam, year of birth, name (if any), gender, color, and registration number (eg., Jockey
Club Certificate Number for thoroughbreds and AHRA number for Arabians). For a discussion
of the proper method of describing a horse for Article 9 purposes, see infra notes 175-79 and
accompanying text
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terms that are frequently omitted, or poorly phrased, are the warranty and
disclaimer of warranty provisions.'
Because the purchase price for a horse is often quite high,' it is com-
mon for private sales transactions to involve payment of the purchase price
partly in cash with the balance paid by a promissory note.4 7 To secure the
note, the seller typically does, and should, obtain a security agreement and
file the appropriate financing statement(s).41 The note and security agree-
ment in a horse sale transaction should contain such standard clauses as the
complete name and address of the parties,' an unconditional promise to
pay, a description of the horse,5" a covenant as to where the horse will be
kept,51 a list of events of default, and a clause that incorporates the terms of
the purchase and sales agreement. 2
Questions about the interpretation and enforcement of the written
purchase contract for a horse must be viewed in light of UCC section 2-202,
which identifies the written contract as the main source for determining the
actual terms of the sale. UCC section 2-202 provides that the written terms
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supple-
45. For a discussion of warranties and disclaimer provisions, see infra notes 72-145 and ac-
companying text.
46. For information about the purchase prices paid for thoroughbred yearlings, weanlings
and two-year-olds at public sales in 1989, see supra note 34. Obviously, such data on private sales
is not available because of the private nature of those transactions.
47. See, eg., Jacobs v. Lancaster, 526 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1981)($25,000 note as part
payment of purchase price). The public sales are usually handled on a "cash" basis, with the
purchaser arranging his own financing through a financial institution. Private sales have greater
flexibility, and the seller is often asked to take back a note for part of the price.
48. For a more extensive discussion of the perfection of security interest in horses under UCC
Article 9, see infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
49. The failure to get the proper name and address of the debtor exactly right can be fatal to
the validity of the security interest. See, eg., In re Beaver Dam Grain, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1845 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984)(a financing statement signed by "B.C. Christopher Co.
dba Beaver Dam Grain" was not sufficient as to Beaver Dam Grain, Inc.).
50. For a suggested minimum standard for describing a horses, see supra note 44. This is an
especially important matter in Kentucky, where the standards for description of collateral are, at
least arguably, exceptionally strict. For a discussion of descriptions for security agreement pur-
poses in Kentucky and elsewhere, see infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
51. It is also advisable for the seller to prohibit the buyer from moving the horse elsewhere,
other than on a temporary basis, without the seller's prior written consent. Such a prohibition
helps protect the seller's security interest and helps to eliminate the need for "shot-gun" filing of
financing statements. See UCC § 9-103; UCC § 9-401. For a discussion of the need to file financ-
ing statements in connection with racehorse and other horse sales, infra notes 185-97 and and
accompanying text.
52. For a more complete discussion of the impact of Article 9 of the UCC, the classification
of the collateral, and the filing of the financing statements, see infra notes 171-98 and accompany-
ing text.
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mented by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete or exclu-
sive statement of the terms of the agreement.5 a
In light of this contract interpretation rule, the use of a merger clause 4
in racehorse sales contracts is particularly appropriate. Such a clause is
especially important to the seller because it severely limits the purchaser's
ability to introduce evidence of additional terms or warranties. The inclu-
sion of such a merger clause also makes it more difficult for a court to
invoke the "explanation" or "supplementation" rationale of UCC section 2-
202 for admitting oral statements and prior agreements. Accordingly, a
purchase contract, with a merger clause, may be looked to by both parties
and by the court for all of the terms and conditions of the agreement be-
tween the parties, without the need or the ability to use any additional
terms outside of the written contract to help explain or supplement the
contract.55
The failure to include a merger clause within the written contract for
the sale of a horse had significant consequences for the seller in Alpert v.
Thomas. 6 Despite the existence of a written sales contract, the Alpert court
found that oral statements made by the seller's agent prior to the execution
of the contract constituted an express warranty as to the horse's breeding
abilities.57 More specifically, the court held that the doctrine of contract
merger could not be applied to exclude the oral express warranty because
53. UCC § 2-202(b). Note that by negative implication, and absent anything to the contrary,
a written agreement may theoretically be contradicted by evidence of a subsequent oral agreement.
More importantly, however, the explanation and supplementation loopholes provide a way for a
court to allow the admissibility of evidence of oral warranties and other oral contract terms, if the
court is otherwise inclined to do so. Theoretically, this parol evidence rule of the UCC excludes
evidence of oral warranties or other oral terms of a contract, but courts will frequently go to great
lengths to get such evidence admitted if they feel that one party or the other has taken unfair
advantage. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at Chapter 2.
54. A typical merger clause reads as follows:
THIS AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES AND SO INITIALED BY BOTH
PARITIES IN THE MARGIN OPPOSITE THIS PARAGRAPH CONSTITUTES A
FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION OF ALL THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT
AND IS A COMPLETE AND EXCLUSIVE STATEMENT OF THOSE TERMS AND
ANY AND ALL REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, WARRANTIES OR STATE-
MENTS BY SELLER'S AGENT THAT DIFFER IN ANY WAY FROM THE TERMS
OF THIS WRITTEN AGREEMENT SHALL BE GIVEN NO FORCE OR EFFECT.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 2-12 (emphasis original).
55. See, e.g., Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brockway Imco, Inc., 809 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1987);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grady, 27 Ohio App. 3d 321, 501 N.E.2d 68 (1985). See
generally, WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 2-12.
56. 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986).
57. Id. at 1415.
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the contract did not contain a merger clause 58 In reliance on Alpert, the
purchaser of a racehorse could accuse the seller of having orally stated, and
thus warranted, that the horse would be a winner absent an effective merger
clause.59
Even though a purchase contract may contain detailed and complete
terms and conditions, including a merger clause, a court may need to look
to factors outside of the contract to resolve an interpretation dispute be-
tween the parties. UCC section 2-202(a) provides that the written terms of
a contract may be "explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage
of trade (section 1-205) or by course of performance (section 2-208)."'
When applying these principles, the express terms of the contract take pre-
cedence over all other factors. If the expressed terms are ambiguous, courts
next examine course of performance, then course of dealing and finally us-
age of trade.'
If the parties have a different interpretation of an express term of the
purchase contract, the most persuasive evidence of what the term should
mean is any evidence as to how the parties have interpreted the term. How-
ever, this course of performance interpretation tool has limited applicability
in the horse industry because a single sales contract rarely "involves re-
peated occasions for performance" to be "accepted or acquiesced" in by
both parties.62 The next UCC principle to be applied by a court to interpret
a disputed express term of an agreement is course of dealing. Under this
principle the court searches for "a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as estab-
lishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
and other conduct., 63 A series of horse sales and purchases between the
same parties is not uncommon, and thus unclear or disputed terms in a
58. Id.
59. An express warranty may be made by "any affirmation of fact or promise," regardless of
any intention to give a warranty, UCC § 2-313(1)(a).
60. See also UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (one of the stated purposes and policies of the UCC is to
"permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties . . ."); Miller, supra note 10, at 781.
61. See UCC §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
62. See, e.g., Lockwood Corp. v. Black, 501 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex. 1980) aff'd, 669 F.2d
324 (5th Cir. 1982) (course of performance supplied interest charge term); T.J. Stevenson & Co.,
Inc. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980) reh'g denied, 651 F.2d 779 (5th Cr.
1981). (Express notice provisions waived by course of performance). See generally WrTE &
SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 1-6.
63. UCC § 1-205(1).
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sales contract could be interpreted in light of the prior sales transactions
between the parties."
The final UCC interpretation tool for contract terms is the usage of
trade principle. Section 1-205(2) defines a usage of trade as "any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation
or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to
the transaction in question." The horse business has a very well-developed
set of trade customs and usages that are peculiar to the equine industry. In
deciding equine cases, courts should, whenever possible, conform their deci-
sions to the reasonable expectations of the buyers and sellers. Those expec-
tations are reflected in the trade usages of the equine industry.65
Keck v. Wacker66 provides a good example of a court's application of
the usage of trade principle to resolve a dispute between a buyer and a seller
of a horse. The controversy in Keck centered around the proper description
of the horse sold. More specifically, the dispute focused on the correct list-
ing of a mare sold at auction. This mare previously was bred and found to
be in foal, but on a subsequent examination was found to be "empty" with
no signs of a fetus.6" The seller asserted that the mare was properly listed as
"barren," while the purchaser argued that the mare should have been listed
as "slipped."6 The court and the parties agreed that "barren" meant "bred
and did not conceive" while "slipped" meant "bred, conceived and then
aborts its foal."'69
Both parties offered expert testimony in an attempt to demonstrate that,
under the usage of trade principle, their description of the horse was
proper.70 After considering the expert testimony, the court held for the
64. UCC § 1-205(1); see, ag., Moffat County State Bank v. Producers Livestock Mktg. As-
soc., 598 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1984), aff'd, 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Central Livestock Assoc., 349 F. Supp. 1033 (D. N.D. 1972).
65. See, eg., Torstenson v. Melcher, 195 Neb. 764, 241 N.W.2d 103 (1976)(usage of trade
excluded implied warranty in sale of bull). For a detailed discussion of the application of the trade
usage principle to the horse industry, see Miller, supra note 10, at 781-838. As Mr. Miller notes,
"there are some areas of law in which the court has no choice but to look to the customs and
usages that surround the transaction before it." Id. at 837. This is especially true where the
parties have left a term open, or ambiguous, in the written expression of their contract. See id.
Moreover, sometimes a contract term that appears ambiguous to someone outside the industry is
perfectly clear to someone familiar with the customs and usages of horsemen.
66. 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
67. Id. at 1381.
68. Id.
69. Id. See generally J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 210, 219.
70. The seller's expert testimony was provided by a representative of Claiborne Farms, the
seller's agent, and a representative of C.V. Whitney Farm. The purchaser's expert testimony was
provided by a veterinarian, the general manager of the California Thoroughbred Breeder's Associ-
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purchaser and stated that the seller's listing of the mare as barren "was not
in accordance with a usage of trade in the thoroughbred horse industry."71
D. Express and Implied Warranties
A purchaser of an expensive thoroughbred horse typically has high ex-
pectations for the animal. At a minimum, the purchaser expects the horse
to be healthy and suitable for the purposes (i.e., racing and/or breeding) for
which the horse was purchased.72 If the purchaser's expectations are not
satisfied, a dispute is likely to result. The focus of such a dispute typically
centers around whether the seller breached an expressed and/or implied
warranty.
1. Express Warranties
An express warranty in the horse industry is created by any affirmation
of fact about the horse or the description of the horse which becomes part
of the basis of the bargain."m A seller of a horse may give an expressed
warranty either in writing or orally.74 In Keck, the description of a horse as
"barren" within an auction sales catalog was held to be an express warranty
of description.75 Even though the seller may have had no intention of war-
ranting the horse's breeding status, he is deemed to have made such a war-
ranty because the affirmation of fact or description was made to the buyer.
Most astute horse sellers are, or should be, generally aware that they
will be held accountable for any written descriptions or affirmations made
concerning their horse up for sale.76 However, a horse seller can uninten-
ation, the owner of Normandy Farm, and a former Kentucky Racing Commission member. Keck,
413 F. Supp. at 1381.
71. Id. Prior to Keck, most sales catalogs listed mares as "in foal," "barren," or "not bred."
"Beginning in 1984, because of some lawsuits, most sales companies ... added an additional
status of '[s]lipped'...."J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 84.
72. In the context of other breeds, such as Arabians, the expectations may relate to showing
rather than racing.
73. UCC § 2-313(l)(a)-(b). UCC § 2-313(1)(c) provides a third way of creating an express
warranty under the UCC, through the use of samples or models. For obvious reasons, this
method is not significant in the horse industry.
74. UCC § 2-313; see, eg., Miron v. Yenlers Raceway Inc., 400 R.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1986) (oral
statement created an express warranty).
75. For a discussion of the Keck decision, see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
76. If a horse is described as a "stallion" or "broodmare," orally or in a catalog, has the seller
warranted that it can breed? If a horse is described as a two-year-old in training, does that de-
scription imply that the horse will be able to complete that training and run a race? The warranty
of description, when applied to horses, has potentially far reaching consequences. For maximum
safety, the seller should describe the animal as "a two-year-old bay male thoroughbred [or
whatever applies] horse by X out of Y by Z." Shortcutting the use of any unnecessary descriptive
language might lead to liability under a warranty of description.
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tionally provide an express warranty to a buyer through oral statements
made to the buyer in connection with the sale. Mere "puffing" or "trade
talk"77 does not create a warranty.78 On the other hand, specific statements
of fact or descriptions do create express warranties, regardless of the ab-
sence of any specific intention on the seller's part to make a warranty?' 9 In
Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 0 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a purchaser of a horse received an express
warranty from the seller when the auctioneer, during a lull in the bidding,
stated that the horse up for bid, and ultimately purchased by the plaintiff,
was "as sound - as, as gutty a horse as you want to find anywhere. He'll
race a good mile for you every time. He's got loads of heart." '
As one might expect, it is not always easy to determine whether state-
ments made by a seller constitute an express warranty or merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the horse.8 2 Accordingly, the particular facts
and circumstances involved and the specific statements made, as well as the
predilections of the court, must be carefully examined in each situation.
The cases in this area involving racehorses are not altogether consistent in
their holdings, and a variety of holdings have also been made in somewhat
analogous cases involving other animals. For example, consider two cases
involving an action brought by an unhappy purchaser of a breeding bull. In
Adrian v. Elmer,83 the court found an express warranty within the seller's
assertions that the bull was " 'guaranteed to be a good breeder... [and] one
hundred percent sound.' ,4 In Frederickson v. Hackney,85 however, the
court found that the seller's assertions that the bull would put the purchaser
"on the map" and that the bull's sire was the "greatest living dairy bull"
77. Frederickson v. Hackney, 159 Minn. 234, 198 N.W. 806, 806 (1924). For a discussion of
the Frederickson case, see infra 85-86 and accompanying text.
78. UCC § 2-313(2) provides that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a state-
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty." In Forbis v. Reilly, 684 F.Supp. 1317, 1320-22 (W.D. Pa. 1988), for example, the
following statements by an Arabian horse breeder were held to be "no more than puffing" and not
a warranty: "a good mare to start a breeding program with"; "one of her [breeder's] top 3 colts,
or that he [the colt] was active and graceful."
79. UCC § 2-313(2), comment 3.
80. 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
81. Id. at 114. Although an express warranty was found to exist, the court held that the
purchaser failed to prove a breach of warranty. Id. at 116.
82. Compare Norton v. Lindsay, 350 F.2d 46, 49 (10th Cir. 1965)(oral statement that a horse
was "sound" created an express warranty that seller breached) with Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 765
(oral statement that horse was "sound" held to be an opinion or commendation, not an express
warranty).
83. 178 Kan. 424, 482 P:2d 599 (1955).
84. Id. at 602.
85. 159 Minn. 234, 198 N.W. 806 (Minn. 1924).
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constituted "trade talk" and not an express warranty.8 6 This uncertainty
suggests that sellers should exercise extraordinary caution.
2. Implied Warranties
In addition to the express warranties that may be created, unintention-
ally or intentionally, by a seller's statements, there are also three very signif-
icant "implied warranties" that often arise in the horse industry by
operation of law. First, the seller of a horse warrants that "[t]he title con-
veyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful. ."87 and that the horse "shall
be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance
.." that the buyer does not know about.88 Given the multitude of security
interests, agister's liens and stallion service liens that can be attached to
horses, the implied warranty of title should be considered in connection
with each sales transaction.8 9
The next implied warranty to consider is the warranty of
merchantability, as provided under UCC section 2-314.90 Unless excluded
or modified,9 the purchase contract between a merchant seller and any
purchaser includes an implied warranty that the horse is merchantable.92
UCC section 2-314(2) provides six conjunctive standards for determining
whether the goods involved in any transaction are merchantable. However,
86. Id. at 806. The decision whether certain words constitute an opinion or commendation
rather than an express warranty is a question for the trier of fact. See UCC § 2-313 comment 3;
see also Yuzwak v. Dygert, 354 N.Y.S. 2d 35,36 (1988); Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 765.
87. UCC § 2-312(1)(a).
88. UCC § 2-312(I)(b).
89. For a discussion of security interests in the horse industry, see infra notes 171-98 and
accompanying text. See generally Lester, Security Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred
Horses: A Transactional Approach, 70 KY. L.J. 1065 (1981-82); Vance, Protecting Security Inter-
ests in Equine Collateral Under the Clear Title Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985, 78 Ky.
L.J. 447 (1989-90); Keaton, Security Interests in Horses, Seminar on Equine Law, May 1, 1986,
University of Kentucky College of Law.
90. UCC § 2-314 only applies to sellers who are considered to be "merchants." Most horse
sellers will turn out to be merchants. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of UCC 2-316 and of the ability to modify and exclude implied warran-
ties, see infra notes 123-45 and accompanying text.
92. UCC § 2-314. Liability under the UCC's implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose can be viewed as a form of strict liability, with the concepts of fault
and failure to use reasonable care irrelevant as to the determination of liability. See, e.g., Pudwill
v. Brown, 294 N.W.2d 790, 793 (S.D. 1980)(seller's good faith and lack of negligence in providing
pigs he believed to be fit and healthy is no defense to an action for the breach of an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)(this case was later superceded by S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-316, see Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W. 2d 134 (1984)); Vlases v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967)(seller's inability to discover and cure defects in
chicks is no bar to liability in an action for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability
and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
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given the special nature of the goods sold in the horse industry, only two of
the standards can practically be applied to the sale of horses. First, the
horse sold must "pass without objection" in the horse business under the
contract description.93 Next, the horse sold must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes" for which it is used.9"
In Sessa v. Riegle,9" a dissatisfied purchaser of a standardbred horse
brought an action against the seller to recover damages for a breach of both
expressed and implied warranties. Included within the purchaser's action
was a claim that the seller breached the implied warranty of
merchantability.96 After purchasing the racehorse from the defendant, the
plaintiff discovered that the horse suffered both tendonitis and intermittent
claudication 97 Despite the problems that the purchaser experienced with
the horse, the court held that the seller did not breach the implied warranty
of merchantability.9"
In its interpretation of the merchantability standards of UCC section 2-
314(2), the Sessa court stated that "[t]he standard established does not re-
quire that goods be outstanding or superior. It is only necessary that they
be of reasonable quality within expected variations and fit for the ordinary
purposes for which they are used."99 The court then applied this standard
to the facts at issue and held that
[e]ven with tendinitis [sic] and intermittent claudication Tarport
Conaway met this standard. The tendinitis [sic] was merely tempo-
rary and of no long term effect. The intermittent claudication did
not prevent him from becoming a creditable if unspectacular race
horse. After rest and recuperation, he won three races in thirteen
starts in 1975. Certainly he did not live up to Sessa's hopes for a
preferred pacer, but such disappointments are an age old story in the
horse racing business. Anyone who dares to deal in standardbreds
93. UCC § 2-314(2)(a).
94. UCC § 2-314(2)(c). The other standards are not helpful in the context of the horse busi-
ness because horses are not "fungible," see UCC § 2-314(b), do not come in multiple "units," see
UCC § 2-314(d), and are not "contained, packaged, and labeled," see U.CC § 2-314(e)-(f).
95. 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 568 R. 2d 770 (3d 1978). The court ultimately
found for the defendant and denied recovery to the plaintiff. Id.
96. Id. at 769. The court held that the seller was a merchant and thus an implied warranty of
merchantability could be established by the buyer. Id.
97. Id. at 767. The tendonitis was described as swelling of the tendons of both front legs of
the horse. Id. at 763. The horse, however, recovered from the condition within two days after
diagnosis by the veterinarian. Id. The intermittent claudication was described as a "thrombosis
or blockage of the arteries supplying fresh blood" to the horse's hind legs. Id. After giving the
horse approximately two years of rest, the plaintiff put the horse back in training and raced it 13
times. Id. at 764. The horse won three races. Id.
98. Id. at 769-70.
99. Id. at 769.
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knows that whether you pay $2500.00 or $250,000.00, a given horse
may prove to be a second Hambletonian or a humble hayburner.
Consequently, since Tarport Conaway was able to hold his own with
other standardbreds, he was reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes
for which race horses are used, and was merchantable." 0
To the extent that other courts follow Sessa, the implied warranty of
merchantability in the racehorse context becomes a warranty of the ability
to race at the time of sale, not the ability to win.
The third and final implied warranty created under the UCC and appli-
cable to the horse industry is the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.101 The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is nar-
rower, more specific and not as common as the implied warranty of
merchantability. An unsatisfied horse purchaser must prove the following
four elements to establish the existence of an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose:
(a) The horse was purchased for a particular purpose other than its
ordinary purpose;1°2
(b) The seller had reason to know the buyer's particular purpose;1 0 3
(c) The seller had reason to know that the buyer was relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish the horse; 10 4 and
(d) The buyer actually relied upon the seller's skill or judgment.10 5
In the racehorse context, each of these elements takes on a certain ambigu-
ity that is not necessarily present when other types of goods are involved.
Although it is clear that a sales transaction may include both an implied
warranty of merchantability and an implied warranty for a particular pur-
pose, 0 6 it is not uncommon for the two warranties to be confused and/or
combined in their application to a given fact pattern, especially when the
sale involves horses or other animals.'07 In Viases v. Montgomery Ward &
100. Id. at 770.
101. UCC § 2-315.
102. UCC § 2-315 comment 2 states:
a 'particular purpose' differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used in
that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business
whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept
of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.
103. UCC § 2-315, comment 1.
104. UCC § 2-315, comment 5.
105. UCC § 2-315, comment 1. Even if all four elements are present, a seller can waive or
modify this implied warranty pursuant to UCC § 2-316. See infra notes 124-45 and accompany-
ing text.
106. See UCC § 2-315 comment 2, which states that "a contract may of course include both a
warranty of merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose."
107. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 9-10 ("Such confusion under the
Code is inexcusable").
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Co.,' for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit found that the seller of one day old chicks breached both the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose because
the chicks purchased by the plaintiff were afflicted with avian leukosis or
"bird cancer." Without examining the necessary elements to establish the
implied warranties, the Viases court merely stated that the chicks did not
"conform to the normal commercial standards" and that they did not meet
the "buyer's particular purpose, a condition upon which he had the right to
rely." 10 9
The case law applying the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose to the horse industry and to animals in general, is sparse. More-
over, in the animal context, there has been some confusion regarding what
constitutes an "ordinary purpose" and what constitutes a "particular pur-
pose." 110 The courts' application of this warranty has provided little help
in reducing this confusion for participants in the horse industry. For exam-
ple, consider a stallion purchased for breeding purposes that proves to be
defective. The horse appears to be healthy in all respects except for its
breeding abilities. Does the ability to breed constitute an ordinary purpose
or a particular purpose? In Alpert, the court stated that the "custom and
usage in the horse trade indicates that the implied warranty of
merchantability includes the warranty that the stallion is fertile and capable
of getting a mare in foal."' 1 ' In several decisions concerning pigs
purchased for breeding (called "gilts"), courts have addressed this issue. In
the majority of these cases the courts have characterized the ability to breed
108. 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
109. Id. at 849. A sympathetic plaintiff obviously made it much easier for the court to make
its decision. The plaintiff was a Greek immigrant who worked alone on the construction of his
chicken coops "twelve hours a day, fifty-two weeks a year" for three years. Id. at 848. The court
also noted that the plaintiff slept in the coop with the new chicks for the first six months "in order
to give the new chicks his undivided attention." Id.; see also Travis, 734 P.2d at 958 (seller of
horse breached implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
110. See Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied to Implied Warranties of
"Merchantability" and "Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73 Ky. L.J. 665, 679 (1984-85)(author
implies that racehorse's ability to race and stallion's ability to breed are ordinary purposes and not
particular purposes); Eftink, Implied Warranties in Livestock Sales: Case History and Recent De-
velopments, 4 AGRIC. L.J. 207, 213 (1982-83)("A seller might ask, what is the ordinary purpose of
these animals, in view of the admonition of § 2-315 comment (2) that an ordinary purpose is not a
particular purpose for this section."); S. FAVRE & M. LORING, ANIMAL LAW § 6.13, at 93
(1983)(gilt's ability to breed constitutes ordinary purpose).
111. 643 F. Supp. at 1415. In O'Shea v. Hatch, 97 N.M. 409, 640 P.2d 515, 519-790 (Ct.
App. 1982), a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was found in the
sale of a show horse to a purchaser who purchased the horse for use by children. It turned out the
horse was not a gelding of gentle disposition as represented by the seller but, rather, a ridgeling,
which is a colt that was improperly castrated so that only one testicle was removed. Id.
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as a particular purpose and, thus, they have applied the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.1 12 Under a similar line of cases, defects in
feeder pigs were held to violate the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose.1 13
When examining the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, it is also common for a court to avoid or circumvent the ordinary
purpose versus particular purpose inquiry by finding that the purchaser did
not satisfy one of the other necessary elements to establish the implied war-
ranty. In Sessa, for example, the court examined a claim for the breach of
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in connection with
the purchase and sale of a standardbred. I 4 The Sessa court held that the
seller did not create an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
because the purchaser did not rely on the seller to select the horse." 5 More
specifically, the court found that the purchaser relied on his own agent to
select the horse.1 1 6
The decision to either apply the implied warranty of merchantability or
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to the exclusion of
the other does have significance to buyers and sellers. In addition to the
more narrow scope of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, two other significant differences exist between the two implied war-
ranties. First, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
applies to all sellers, whereas the implied warranty of merchantability only
applies to sellers who are merchants. 7 Accordingly, a purchaser of a de-
fective horse from a non-merchant is precluded from establishing an action
112. A breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was found in the follow-
ing cases: Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415 (1976)(atrophic
rhinitis in breeding pigs); Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968)(unspecified dis-
ease in breeding pigs); Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, Inc., 192 Nev. 168, 219 N.W.2d 750
(1974)(atrophic rhinitis in breeding pigs). But see Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Companies, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 493, 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (Ct. App. 1980)(contagious disease in breeding pigs is incon-
sistent with their ordinary purpose, rather than their particular purpose; thus the "w]aranty of
merchantability is implicated" rather than the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
113. See Pudwill, 294 N.W.2d at 792 (salt poisoning in feeder pigs); W & W Livestock Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Iowa 1970)(pneumonia and bloody scours in feeder
pigs).
114. For a more complete discussion of the Sessa decision, see supra notes 95-100 and accom-
panying text.
115. Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 770.
116. Id.; see also Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir.
1980)(no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because purchaser of bull semen
relied on his agent, not the seller).
117. For a definition of a merchant for UCC purposes, see UCC § 2-104(1). For a discussion
of the application of the merchant definition to horse traders, see supra notes 31-32 and accompa-
nying text.
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for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 1 ' A second impor-
tant difference between the two implied warranties is the UCC section 2-316
requirement that an exclusion of the implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose must usually be in writing, whereas the seller can orally ex-
clude an implied warranty of merchantability." 9
In applying the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose to the sale of a racehorse or any other kind of horse,
courts seem to construe the UCC provisions liberally to find that implied
warranties have been created, especially when either the conduct of the
seller or the circumstances of the buyer suggest a special need for judicial
assistance.
Even if the purchaser of the horse can establish that an implied war-
ranty has been created, however, the purchaser still must prove that the
warranty was breached. 120 Moreover, even if a breach of an implied war-
ranty is proven, the seller may have successfully excluded or modified the
implied warranties by following the straightforward requirements of UCC
section 2-316.121 In addition, even if neither of the implied warranties apply
to a given horse sales transaction, one should not forget the possibility that
an express warranty of description may have been provided by the seller.
For example, a purchaser of a horse described as a stallion might argue that
the seller's description provided an express warranty that the horse would
be suitable for breeding purposes. Finally, the purchaser can try to intro-
duce evidence of usage of trade to support his assertion that the seller's
description of the horse as a stallion is recognized in the industry as a war-
ranty that the horse would be suitable for breeding purposes.122
118. When the seller is not a merchant, the debate over the ordinary versus particular pur-
pose of the horse is extremely important. If breeding and/or racing is considered to be an ordi-
nary purpose, the purchaser will be unable to establish either an implied warranty of
merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. In Alpert, for example
the sellers unsuccessfully tried to escape the application of the implied warranty of
merchantability by arguing that they were not merchants. 643 F. Supp. at 1415-16.
119. For a discussion of warranty disclaimers under, UCC § 2-316, see infra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 769-70 (implied warranty of merchantability applied, but
no breach was found).
121. For a discussion of the ability to exclude the implied warranties, see infra notes 124-45
and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of UCC § 2-202 and the usage of trade principle as applied to the horse
industry, see supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
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3. Exclusion of Warranties
Despite the possible existence of an implied warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose in a horse sales transaction, it is impor-
tant to note and understand that such warranties may not be available to
help a dissatisfied purchaser. Many state legislatures have enacted laws
which limit the scope of these implied warranties in the sale of livestock. At
least ten states have enacted special statutes that govern or limit UCC war-
ranties as applied to the sale of horses,123 while another eight states have
statutes that apply to livestock other than horses. 24 A Kentucky statute
provides, for example, that a seller does not give an implied warranty that
the horse is free from disease or sickness unless the seller knows that the
horse is diseased or sick.'25 The California Agricultural Code excludes the
applicability of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in
the case of livestock sales,' 26 but not the implied warranty of
merchantability. Accordingly, in California, a dissatisfied purchaser of a
horse is not precluded by statute from bringing an action for a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability.' 27 Due to the variations contained
within the special state statutes that cover horses, each state's statute and
interpretive case law should be reviewed. As a general observation, how-
ever, most of the special livestock statutes excluding implied warranties are
generally enacted as state variations of UCC section 2-316.
For those states in which the implied warranties are not excluded by
statute, a seller may still be able to modify or exclude the implied warran-
ties using a variety of methods provided in UCC section 2-316. Under
UCC section 2-316(2), a seller can modify or exclude the implied warranty
of merchantability in a conspicuous writing that includes the term
123. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-316(3)(d)(ii) (1989); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 18501
(West 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 § 2-316(3)(d) (Smith-Hard 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-
316 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (Baldwin 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 400.2-
316(5) & 277.141 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(3)(d) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-
02-33(3)(e) (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-315 (1989); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.316(f) (Vernon 1989).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 672.2-316(3)(d) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(3)(d) (1989); IND.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-316(3)(d) (Burns 1989); MICH. COMP. LAws § 440.2316(3)(d) (1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-2-315 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 91-2-316(3)(d) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 2-316(3)(d) (West 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-316.1 (1989).
125. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (Baldwin 1989).
126. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 18501 (West 1989).
127. The discussion and resolution of the ordinary versus particular purpose of a horse be-
comes even more important in light of the California statute. For a discussion of identifying the
"ordinary" and "particular" purposes in the purchase of a horse, see supra notes 101-23 and
accompanying text.
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"merchantability. '1 28 Similarly, a seller can exclude or modify the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose through the use of a conspicu-
ous writing. 129
Although the ability to exclude the implied warranties under UCC sec-
tion 2-316(2) appears to be rather straightforward, the application of this
section, especially the requirement of a conspicuous disclaimer, often leads
to inconsistent results.1 31 In Two Rivers Co. v- Curtiss Breeding Service,",
the Fifth Circuit found that a seller of bull semen properly and conspicu-
ously disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability. The seller in-
cluded a lengthy disclaimer on the back of each invoice that the purchaser
received. Included within the seller's disclaimer was the following lan-
guage: "[SELLER] MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTY OF ANY KIND
AND HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, BOTH EXPRESS
AND IMPLIED, OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE., 132
In Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Companies,133 however, the court held
that the seller's disclaimer language on the back of the order confirmation
slip for the purchase and sale of breeding pigs, nearly identical to the lan-
guage successfully used by the seller in Two Rivers Co., was not conspicu-
ous, and therefore did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of
128. UCC § 2-316(2). Although a written disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability is clearly preferable, the disclaimer may be made orally. Such an oral disclaimer,
however, must withstand the prohibitions and challenges of admissibility under the parol evidence
rule of UCC § 2-202. For a discussion of UCC § 2-202 and the parol evidence rule, see supra
notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
129. UCC § 2-316(2). This section further states that "[1]anguage to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that '[t]here are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof.'" UCC § 2-316(2).
130. UCC § 1-201(10) describes "conspicuous" in the following manner:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-
NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is
'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any
stated term is 'conspicuous.' Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for deci-
sion by the court.
131. 624 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981). The court found
that the purchaser failed to establish the existence of the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose, and therefore did not apply the disclaimer to it. Id.
132. Id. The court also noted that the seller conveyed the disclaimer to the purchaser at the
time of purchase and that the disclaimer was also included within the seller's Breeding Guide
which had been previously examined by the purchaser. Id. See also Cohen v. North Ridge
Farms, Inc., 712 F.Supp. 1265, 1269 (E.D. Ky 1989) (seller of horse at auction successfully dis-
claimed implied warranties in auction catalog's conditions of sale).
133. 87 Ill. App. 3d 493, 501-02, 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (1980)(overruling trial court's find-
ing on this matter).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
merchantability.13 a According to the Anderson court, the seller's disclaimer
was not conspicuous, despite the use of capital letters, because the inclusion
of the disclaimer on the reverse side of the order slip was not conspicuous
"from the general appearance of the slip or from any conspicuous language
on the front side of the slip."135 Although the Anderson court strained a bit
to get to its desired result, the decision does provide practical advice for the
seller of any goods, including horses, who wishes to disclaim the implied
warranties. A seller should take great pains to make the disclaimer so con-
spicuous that a court will have no choice but to find that it is effective under
UCC section 2-316(2). For example, whenever possible, the seller of a
horse should include the disclaimer in bold face capital letters on the first
page of any multi-page document or in a section immediately next to the
purchaser's signature. The seller in Anderson might have successfully dis-
claimed the implied warranty of merchantability if the seller had made the
following sentence on the bottom of the first page of the order slip more
conspicuous (Le., put it in capital, bold-face letters): "This order subject to
conditions on reverse side hereof and subject to acceptance by the
company.s 136
UCC section 2-316 provides a few other methods for sellers to extin-
guish an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular pur-
pose in connection with the sale of a horse.1 37 Of particular importance to
the horse industry is UCC section 2-316(3)(b), which provides that "when
the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods ... as
134. The seller's disclaimer included the following language: "[SELLER] MAKES NO
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO
MERCHANTABLILITY FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR ANY OTHER
MATTER WITH RESPECT TO THE GILTS." Id. at 496, 408 N.E.2d at 1196.
135. Id. at 502, 408 N.E.2d at 1200. The court supported its decision by stating that under
the circumstances little was contained on the front of the slip "to bring to a reasonable person's
attention and notice the existence of express disclaimers on the reverse side of the slip." Id.
136. Id.; see also Travis, 734 P.2d at 958. In Travis, an otherwise valid disclaimer of implied
warranties contained within a horse auction sales catalog was held by an intermediate appellate
court to be invalid because it was not explicitly negotiated between the seller and the buyer. Id.
Although many of the courts's conclusions in Travis were reversed by the Supreme Court of
Washington, it is highly recommended that, from a seller's viewpoint, the disclaimers typically
contained within auction sales catalogs be conspicuously repeated on the documents to be signed
by the purchaser to confirm the sale. But see Cohen, 712 F.Supp. at 1269 (warranty disclaimer in
auction sales catalog enforced by court).
137. UCC § 2-316(3)(a) provides an alternative method for a seller to exclude all implied
warranties, either in writing or orally, through the use of certain expressions. UCC § 2-316(3)(a)
provides that "all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty." Obviously, it is best if the seller
conspicuously includes this language in a writing; however, a mere oral statement may be enough
to exclude the implied warranties. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him .... " Even though a purchaser of a horse
may be able to discover many problems with the horse in a routine sound-
ness exam, such a routine exam typically will not reveal latent defects such
as respiratory abnormalities, the existence of prior orthoscopic surgery to
remove bone chips, and the like. Thus, the "examination" exception will be
of only limited value to a seller unless the seller demands that the buyer
have a veterinarian conduct a complete examination of the horse.
In Calloway v. Manion,138 the plaintiff traded a gelding horse in ex-
change for the defendant's mare. The defendant successfully excluded the
implied warranties because he proved that he had demanded that the plain-
tiff have the horse examined by a veterinarian prior to the trade, but the
plaintiff had refused. 139 In Alpert, however, the seller of an Arabian horse
for breeding purposes was not able to exclude the implied warranties under
the examination exception because the seller agreed to examine the horse,
the seller did not demand an examination by the purchaser, and the pur-
chaser "did not have the necessary skills or equipment to perform such an
exam herself when she looked at the horse."1
UCC section 2-316(3)(c) provides yet another way for a seller to exclude
or modify the implied warranties. UCC section 2-316(3)(c) provides that
"an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing
or course of performance or usage of trade.""14 In Torstenson v. Melcher,
for example, a seller of a breeding bull produced sufficient usage of trade
evidence to exclude the applicability of any implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose.142
Finally, a discussion of a seller's ability to exclude or modify implied
warranties would not be complete without at least mentioning the possible
application of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.143  The
Magnuson-Moss Act and its regulations impose certain restrictions and lan-
guage requirements upon sellers who seek to exclude or modify warranties
138. 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1978).
139. Id. at 1035 n.2, 1036. The jury determined that the examination would have revealed
the presence of the defect, an incipient ovary. Id.
140. 643 F. Supp. at 1417 (due to low sperm count, horse was unsatisfactory as a prospective
breeder); see also Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 241 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974).
141. For a discussion of course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade, see
supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
142. 195 Neb. 764, 241 N.W.2d 103, 106 (1976).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (1988). For official interpretations and implementing regulations,
see 16 C.F.R. pts. 700-03.
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in a consumer sales transaction.'" If a horse is being sold to a purchaser
for "personal, family or household purposes," such as the sale of a pleasure
horse, the seller should be aware of the Magnuson-Moss provisions.' 45
E. Buyer's Remedies Upon Learning of a Defect
1. Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance
The UCC provides a limited number of potential remedies for a dissatis-
fied horse purchaser. Basically, the purchaser can (i) try to unwind the sale
by either rejecting the horse;' 46 or revoking acceptance of the horse. 47 and/
or (ii) seek damages for the seller's breach of a warranty.' 48  If a buyer
somehow learns of a material and undisclosed defect in the horse after the
purchase contract is entered into but before the seller takes delivery or con-
temporaneously with delivery, the buyer can reject the horse under UCC
sections 2-601 and 2-602 on the grounds that the horse fails to conform to
the contract. Any such rejection must be "within a reasonable time after
[the horse's] delivery or tender."' 49 If the horse is effectively rejected, the
burden of proving conformity to the contract "presumably remains on the
seller, whereas upon acceptance the buyer has the burden to establish any
breach." 5'
After a purchaser "accepts" the horse it can no longer be rejected by the
purchaser. '5' Acceptance of a horse occurs when, after a reasonable oppor-
tunity to inspect the horse, the buyer: (1) Signifies to the seller that the
horse either conforms to the contract or is acceptable despite its noncon-
formity; or (2) fails to reject the horse; or (3) generally performs any act
inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the horse.' 5 z The fact that the
purchaser has accepted the horse, however, does not necessarily preclude
144. Id.
145. Basically, the Magnuson-Moss Act and its regulations apply to written warranties of
consumer products. It includes various disclosure requirements, and prohibits warranty disclaim-
ers and remedy limitations in some circumstances. Id.
146. See UCC §§ 2-601(a), 2-602.
147. See UCC § 2-608.
148. See UCC § 2-711. A seller may be able to limit the remedies available to a purchaser as
provided under UCC §§ 2-316, 2-719. If it is clear that the limitation agreed to by the parties was
meant to be exclusive of all other remedies and that the remedy does not cause any warranties to
fail of their essential purpose, such limitations would generally be upheld. See, eg., Calloway, 572
F.2d at 1037-38 (remedy limited to exchange of horse for another horse).
149. UCC § 2-602(1), see, e.g., Miron, 400 F.2d at 118 (attempted rejection of horse on day
after auction sale was not within a reasonable time for a rejection).
150. Miron, 400 F.2d at 119.
151. UCC § 2-607(2)("[a]cceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods
accepted ...").
152. UCC § 2-606.
[Vol. 1:171
PURCHASE OF RACEHORSES
the purchaser from unwinding the sale. For UCC purposes, a post-accept-
ance unwinding of a sale is referred to as a revocation of acceptance.153
For a horse purchaser to revoke acceptance of the animal under UCC
section 2-608, he or she must prove: (1) The horse does not conform to the
contract and that nonconformity substantially impairs the value to the
buyer; (2) the buyer accepted the horse either on the reasonable assumption
that the discovered nonconformity would be cured or without discovery of
the nonconformity due to the seller's assurances and/or due to the difficulty
of discovery of the nonconformity; (3) the buyer has revoked acceptance
within a reasonable time after the nonconformity was discovered or should
have been discovered;154 (4) the revocation occurred before any substantial
change in the condition of the horse not caused by its own defects; and (5)
the buyer notified the seller of the revocation. 55 A buyer who properly
revokes acceptance of a horse has the same rights and duties to the horse as
if the buyer had rejected it.156 Accordingly, a revocation of acceptance may
be viewed as a late rejection of the horse, but with a good excuse for the
delay. 157
2. Breach of Warranty
After a buyer has accepted a horse and the time for revocation has
passed, the buyer still may bring an action against the seller on the basis of
153. UCC § 2-608.
154. "Whether an acceptance is revoked within a reasonable time is a question of fact to be
determined by the circumstances of each particular case." Heller v. Sullivan, 57 Ill. App. 3d 190,
195, 372 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (1978)(whether acceptance of horse was timely revoked is a material
issue of fact that could not be resolved as a matter of law by summary judgment). But see Cher-
nick v. Casares, 759 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988)(revocation as to mare untimely as a matter
of law).
155. See generally WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at § 8-4 (a good discussion of a
buyer's right to revoke acceptance under UCC § 2-608). The tough issues involving the revoca-
tion of acceptance of racehorses usually arise from tension between and among the following
factors: (a) some defects in a racehorse can be, at least to some degree, latent; (b) those defects
sometimes could be revealed by a careful veterinary examination, even though they would not
show up in a casual inspection by a layperson; (c) a horse is a living creature that will always have
some defects, in the sense that it is not perfect; and (d) a racehorse is very fragile and can suddenly
become injured, with no advance warning, at any time. Where the alleged defect is an injury, the
allocation of the burden of proof is very important: Once acceptance has occurred, the burden is
on the buyer to establish that the horse was already injured at the time of delivery. UCC § 2-
607(4), see Miron, 400 F.2d at 120.
156. See UCC § 2-608(3).
157. Compare Gilbert v. Caffee, 293 N.W.2d 893, 895-96 (S.D. 1980)(written revocation of
acceptance of show horse 14 months after purchase, and only after buyer learned that he was
being sued for late payment, n6t a timely revocation) with Alpert, 643 F. Supp. at 1417-19 (revoca-
tion of Russian-Arabian stallion effective under UCC § 2-608).
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the seller's breach of one of the express or implied warranties." ' To be
successful in such an action for damages, however, the buyer must give the
seller timely notice of the defect 59 and carry the burden of proof that the
seller breached either an express or implied warranty."
The measure of damages when a dissatisfied purchaser of a racehorse
brings a breach of warranty claim "is the difference at the time and place of
acceptance between the value of the [horse] accepted and the value [the
horse] would have had if [it] had been as warranted." '161 The purchaser
may also be entitled to certain incidental and consequential damages flow-
ing from the seller's breach, such as the costs of transportation, insurance,
care, stud fees, and/or training for the horse purchased.1 62
A proper application of the UCC measure of damages principles to a
breach of warranty claim in a horse sales transaction is provided in
Schleicher v. Gentry." 3 In Schleicher, the purchaser paid $50,000.00 for a
thoroughbred mare identified by the seller to be MISS CAESAR, a valuable
mare that had previously delivered a foal that became a "big money win-
ner."' 64 Eight months after the sale, the purchaser discovered that the
horse was not MISS CAESAR, but rather DOUBLE CHOCOLATE, a
horse valued at $2,700.165 The seller previously owned both horses, got
them mixed up, and sold them under the wrong identity. Accordingly, the
purchaser was awarded $47,300, which equaled the difference between what
he paid for the horse ($50,000) less the actual value of the horse that he
158. See UCC § 2-714. From a pleading standpoint, it is important to note that the UCC has
eliminated the election of remedies doctrine and that a dissatisfied purchaser may seek revocation
of acceptance and damages within a single cause of action. See UCC § 2-608 comment I ("[T]he
buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and recovery of damages for
breach. Both are now available to him."); see also UCC § 2-721 (buyer can also include a claim
for damages for fraud).
159. UCC § 2-607(3)(a) provides that "the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred ... ." Thus,
for example, a purchaser who buys a stallion for breeding purposes and within a few weeks discov-
ers that the horse is not as fertile as warranted by the seller, but who continues to breed the
stallion without notifying the seller, may be unable to maintain an action for breach of warranty.
While this notice requirement may provide an opportunity to cure, it is often of little or no practi-
cal value. The seller may have an early opportunity to examine the evidence of the alleged defect,
but there is usually little or nothing he or she can do to "fix" it.
160. UCC § 2-607(4) provides that "[t]he burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with
respect to the goods accepted."
161. UCC § 2-714(2).
162. See UCC §§ 2-714(3), 2-715.
163. 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
164. Id. at 885. The court noted that the purchaser was Thomas Gentry who, "without
question, is one of the outstanding thoroughbred breeders in the country." Id.
165. Id. The value was determined by the prior sale of the horse under the mistaken identity.
Id.
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actually received ($2,700). In addition, while still under the mistaken idea
that he owned MISS CAESAR, the purchaser paid a $35,000 stud fee for
the breeding services of a good stallion.16 6 As consequential damages, the
purchaser was also awarded $35,000 as a reimbursement for this stud fee. 16 7
The Schleicher court, however, did not allow the purchaser to receive any
amounts to compensate him for the potential lost profits from the sale of
foals in the future.168
One final note about the remedies available to purchasers of defective
horses: The possible applicability of state consumer protection legislation
should not be overlooked. Over the last decade or so, many states have
adopted legislation that permits a buyer of goods to rescind the sale upon a
showing of an unfair or deceptive practice in a consumer purchase. 69 Be-
cause such legislation varies greatly from state to state, it is difficult to make
any general statements as to the impact of such statutes on the horse indus-
try. Nevertheless, a newcomer to the horse industry may be able to charac-
terize the purchase of a horse as a "consumer" transaction and invoke not
only the UCC protections, but also the state consumer protection
statutes.
70
III. ARTICLE 9 AND EQUINE COLLATERAL
A. Introduction
Given the often high prices of equine assets, the industry relies on credit
to run smoothly. The typical sources of credit in the horse industry, as in
any other sales transaction, are either directly from the seller or from a
third party, such as a bank. 17 1 Therefore, execution of promissory notes
166. Id.
167. Id. The court stated that the seller "could have reasonably foreseen that MISS CAE-
SAR would have been purchased by a person such as Mr. Gentry for breeding to a good stallion
such as Graustark, and that a substantial fee would be paid for this service." Id.
168. Id. at 886. The court noted:
[W]e do not believe that the law imposed upon [the seller] the duty to guarantee to a
purchaser of his mare at an auction sale that the purchaser would receive a premium price
or any price for that matter, for a foal conceived in the future, born in the future, and sold
in the future.
Id.
169. See, eg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01-.04 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.86.040 (1989).
170. See, ag., Travis, 734 P.2d at 958-61 (Washington Consumer Protection Act applied to
purchase and sale of a racehorse); But see Cohen 712 F.Supp. at 1271-72 (Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act does not apply to purchase and sale of racehorse).
171. This section will focus on granting and obtaining security interests in connection with
equine purchase and sale transactions. For a discussion of bank-related financing in the horse
industry, as well as such other vital topics as the priority battles among security interests and
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and the granting of security interests to the lender under Article 9 of the
UCC in connection with equine purchase and sales transactions are both
quite common. The nature of the collateral involved in an equine sales
transaction often calls for a unique and special application of UCC
principles.
At the outset, it is of particular significance to note that, although Arti-
cle 2 of the UCC only applies to transactions in "goods," Article 9 applies
to many kinds of collateral other than goods, including accounts, chattel
paper, contract rights, general intangibles, documents and instruments. 72
Therefore, even if the argument were to prevail in a given situation that a
share or season should not be considered a "good" for Article 2 purposes, it
could still fall within the scope of Article 9.
The prerequisites for obtaining a valid security interest in racehorses
and other equine assets are contained in UCC section 9-203. Unless the
seller or lender actually retains possession of the collateral as a secured
party, he or she must obtain a written security agreement that is signed by
the purchaser/debtor, that includes a description of the collateral, and that
grants a security interest to the seller/secured party.173 In addition, the
debtor must receive value and have rights in the collateral. 74 Obtaining a
valid security interest in equine assets is much easier than perfecting the
security interest once it is obtained.
B. Description of Collateral
The description of collateral requirement under UCC section 9-203(1) is
of particular interest to the horse industry. As a general matter of good
between security interests and other types of liens, such as agister's liens and stallion service liens
(e.g., UCC § 9-301; UCC § 9-310); the effect of such security interests on buyers in the ordinary
course (UCC § 9-307); the coordination of security agreements with the terms of the existing
syndicate agreements, and share and season transactions; the practical requirement that the se-
cured party police the collateral and keep track of any changes in its location or use; the secured
party's foreclosure rights (UCC § 9-501); and the secured party's disposition of the horse, share or
season (UCC § 9-504; UCC § 9-505), see Keeton, Security Interests and Horses, Seminar on
Equine Law, May 1, 1986, University of Kentucky College of Law; Lester, supra note 89, at 1065;
Vance, supra note 89, at a447; Miller, Borrowing and Lending on Equine Assets, Seminar on
Equine Law, April 30, 1987, University of Kentucky College of Law.
172. See UCC § 9-102(1). For a discussion of the application of Article 2 to shares and
seasons, see supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
173. See UCC § 9-203(l)(a). Although no particular formality is necessary, a mere memo-
randum containing these elements should be effective.
174. See UCC § 9-203(l)(b)-(c). Again, given the nature of equine sales transactions, these
requirements should not pose a problem. Although it is not a requirement under Article 9, it is a
good idea for a secured party to include an express representation and warranty from the debtor
that there are no other security interests or liens on the collateral.
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common sense and prudent business practice, it is best to be specific in the
description of the equine collateral involved. However, UCC section 9-110
provides that "any description of personal property ... is sufficient whether
or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." Thus, in
light of the UCC section 9-110, one could argue that a description of the
collateral as "my stallion, 'Black Beauty'" is, or should be, sufficient.'
However, in light of questionable case law in Kentucky and other jurisdic-
tions, 76 it would be much better to describe the horse by breed, sire, dam,
sire of dam, year of birth, name (if any), gender, color, and registration
number.'77 Likewise, in the case of shares or seasons, the secured party
should describe the collateral as fully as possible. 178
To be sure that, in the event of foreclosure on the collateral, all of the
value of the equine collateral will be available to satisfy the security interest,
it is suggested that the secured party also take a security interest in such
"additional" collateral as: the offspring and young of the horse, whether
born or unborn; all contract rights and general intangibles of the debtor
pertaining to the horse; stallion seasons or other rights under breeding
agreements or under stallion syndication agreements; racing income,
breeder's awards, income from the sale of stallion seasons, and other in-
come related to the horse; breeder's certificates pertaining to the horse; poli-
cies of insurance on the equine interest being held as collateral; accounts,
accounts receivable, chattel paper, and other rights to payment related to
175. See United States v. Southeast Miss. Livestock Farmers Ass'n, 619 F.2d 435, 438-39
(5th Cir. 1980)(description of collateral as "all livestock... now owned or hereafter acquired by
debtor" sufficient to cover debtor's hogs); United States v. Prinie, 339 F. Supp. 702, 710 (D. Neb.
1972) aff'd 472 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973)(description of collateral as "all livestock" sufficient to
cover debtor's cattle).). In re Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 193, 197-98 (W.D. Wis. 1976)(description of collateral as "all livestock" sufficient to cover
debtor's cattle).
176. See Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)(de-
scription "all farm equipment" construed as too vague to be given effect in a security agreement).
Although Mammoth Cave has been called into question by subsequent decisions, see, e.g., Nolan
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Canmer Deposit Bank, 726 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) ("serious
questions exist as to what, if any, continuing vitality Mammoth Cave currently holds"), and cri-
tized by legal commentators, see, eg., Note, Agricultural Financing Under the U.C.C., 12 ARIZ.
L.REv. 391, 194 (1970); Note, Description of Colateral in a Financing Statement: Should It Be
Required? 4 VALPARISO U.L. REv. 205, 216 (1969), the decision continues to be a reminder to
secured parties that their collateral descriptions should be as specific as possible.
177. For a discussion of the use of registration numbers, see infra notes 180-81 and accompa-
nying text.
178. For example, descriptions pertaining to the interests in a syndicated stallion might in-
clude language such as: "Fractional interest No. 1 in 1982 bay thoroughbred stallion BLACK
BEAUTY by X out of Y by Z" or "The 1990 breeding season pertaining to fractional interest No.
I in the 1982 bay thoroughbred stallion BLACK BEAUTY by X out of Y by Z."
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the horse; and all other proceeds and products of the horse for any of the
foregoing "additional" collateral. 79
As a final note on the issue of collateral description, the significance of
the Jockey Club certificate for a thoroughbred horse and the United States
Trotting Association certificate for a standardbred horse should not be
overlooked."' 0 As mentioned previously, the secured party should at the
very least include any registration numbers from these certificates as a part
of the description of the collateral. In addition, given the importance of the
certificate, it is best for the secured party to actually obtain possession of the
certificate whenever possible. Yet it is sometimes impractical for a secured
party to obtain possession of the certificate, because, for example, the certifi-
cate must be used by the debtor or the debtor's trainer to enter the horse
into races.' 8 '
Even if the secured party has actual possession of the certificate, the
secured party should also expressly take a security interest in the registra-
tion papers of the horse by describing them as part of the collateral. The
separate listing of the registration certificate as separate collateral is espe-
cially important in light of the court's decision in Lee v. Cox.' In Lee, the
court drew a distinction between the horse and the registration certificate,
and found that the registration papers of a horse can be an item of collateral
separate and apart from the horse itself.'8 3 Therefore, under the Lee court's
analysis, the possession of the registration certificate constitutes a perfected
security interest in those papers, but not in the horse itself." 4
179. The use of such a "laundry list" is a common practice in the secured lending industry.
Most banks that lend against equine collateral extensively have their own version of a "laundry
list" of equine assets in which they will take a security interest when they make a loan.
180. The Jockey Club acts as the breed registry for thoroughbreds in the United States and
Canada and as such promulgates rules and regulations governing the registration of thorough-
breds. The United States Trotting Association similarly registers standardbreds pursuant to its
own rules and regulations.
181. Many states require that the-original Jockey Club certificate be in the physical posses-
sion of the person entering the horse in a race. This leads to an obvious conflict with a lender
which wants to keep the certificate in its own possession as additional security.
182. 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 807 (M.D. Tenn. 1976). The horse involved was an
Arabian and as such it was apparently registered with the Arabian Horse Registry of America
(AHRA).
183. Id. at 810. See also In re Wildlife Center, Inc., 102 B.R. 321, 325-26 (Bankruptcy
E.D.N.Y. 1989) (cites and follows Lee decision).
184. Id. at 810-11. The Lee decision, if followed, leads to a bizarre situation in which the
debtor could end up owning the horse free and clear of any encumbrance, but with the secured
party simultaneously owning the ownership papers on the horse. As a practical matter, both the
horse and the registration certificate are almost worthless unless they are owned or controlled by a
single person, so a standoff is created. In that situation, the secured party could try to use the
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C. Characterization of the Collateral
After the creation of a valid security agreement, the secured party gen-
erally must file financing statements that evidence the security interest in
order to make the security interest effective against the claims of third par-
ties."85 UCC section 9-402 describes the requirements for a valid financing
statement. Essentially, the financing statement must contain the name and
address of the debtor and secured party, the signature of the debtor and a
description of the collateral.1 86
As applied to the horse industry, the preparation of financing statements
does not pose any significant problems. But where the financing statements
are to be filed, and in some cases whether financing statements must be filed
at all, will depend on the characterization of the equine collateral under the
UCC.'87 Characterizing equine collateral under the UCC, however, is like
trying to cram a square peg into a round hole. The categories simply do not
The characterization of equine collateral generally depends on its use
and the party who will be using it.t88 A horse that is held, without racing,
breeding or any other use, might be characterized as "inventory" awaiting
resale. 189 If the same horse is held by a consumer, it might be characterized
as a "consumer good."19 If the horse is held for racing purposes, it might
be characterized as "equipment."1 '' A mare or stallion acquired for breed-
ownership papers as leverage to obtain payment from the debtor if the debtor wanted to run the
horse in a race or sell it.
185. See UCC § 9-302(1).
186. See UCC § 9-402(1). "A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing state-
ment if it contains the above information and is signed by the debtor." Id. Pre-printed forms,
commonly referred to as "UCC-" forms, are often filled out to create valid financing statements.
187. UCC §§ 9-103, 9-401 govern the proper locaton to file financing statements based upon
the characterization of the collateral. The characterization of the collateral may also be important
for purchase money security interest priority issues, pursuant to UCC § 9-312.
188. See In re Butcher, 43 Bankr. Rptr. 513, 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)("The better and gener-
ally accepted rule is that the debtor's stated, intended use at the time of attachment of the security
interests defines the nature of the goods [a stallion] for purposes of ascertaining the proper place
for perfecting the security interest.").
189. UCC § 9-109(4) defines inventory as goods:
held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of
services or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or
materials used or consumed in the business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as
his equipment."
190. UCC § 9-109(1) defines consumer goods as goods "used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes ...."
191. UCC § 9-109(2) defines equipment as goods "used or bought for use primarily in busi-
ness (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a
governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inven-
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ing purposes might be characterized as a "farm product."19 Unfortu-
nately, a strong argument can be made for any of several different
classifications based on a single set of facts.
In a similar manner, a share or season might be characterized as inven-
tory, equipment, consumer goods or a farm product depending on its use
and the debtor who uses it. Given the unique nature of shares and seasons,
however, such an equine interest could also conceivably be characterized as
a "contract right,"' 93 a "general intangible"' 94 or even as an "account." '95
In addition, if the secured party takes a security interest not only in the
horse, share or season, but also in the various rights pertaining to that un-
derlying equine interest, a single financing statement may represent several
different categories of collateral.' 96
The result is a "shotgun" approach to the filing of financing statements.
Because it is difficult to classify equine collateral under the UCC, the se-
cured party must file financing statements in every possible location based
on almost every possible characterization of the collateral.' 97 This phenom-
enon, the movement of racehorses from state to state, and the overall need
for a more effective means of encumbering equine collateral has led to pro-
posals that a nationwide registry be established. Such an approach to the
tory, farm products or consumer goods .... See, e.g., In re Bob Schwermer & Assocs., Inc., 27
Bankr. Rptr. 304, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(racehorse owned by debtor who does not farm or breed
horses is considered equipment and not a farm product).
192. UCC § 9-109(3) defines farm products as:
crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are prod-
ucts of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip,
maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products they are
neither equipment nor inventory ....
See, e.g., Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985)(syndicated frac-
tional interest in stallion constitutes a farm product). But see In re Butcher, 43 Bankr. at 521
(stallion used to provide stud services for other horse owner's mares is not a farm product).
193. UCC § 9-106 (1962) defined contract as "any right to payment under a contract not yet
earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." The term has been
eliminated from the 1972 text of the UCC as "unnecessary" and "troublesome." See UCC § 9-
106 & comment on "Reasons for 1972 Change."
194. UCC § 9-106 defines general intangibles as "any personal property (including things in
action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money."
195. UCC § 9-106 defines an account as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has
been earned by performance."
196. For a discussion of the various underlying equine interests that may be part of the secur-
ity interest, see supra 175-84 notes and accompanying text.
197. Such a shotgun approach at attempting to comply with the filing location requirements
of the UCC may be inconvenient but it provides a secured creditor with a much better chance of
having its security interest enforced.
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perfection of security interests in unusual types of collateral would not be
unprecedented, and is long overdue.1 98
CONCLUSION
The purchase and sale of racehorses and other interests in horses are
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, but a distinct body of law has
grown up around the application of the Code to these equine transactions.
To the extent that the unusual nature of equine "goods" calls for special
interpretations of the text of the UCC, the body of case law dealing with the
sale of horses can be considered a mere gloss on the language of the statute.
On the other hand, to the extent that the courts have liberally (and quite
properly) heeded the customs and usages of the horse industry in order to
make the outcomes of the cases conform to the reasonable expectations of
the parties, the law governing the purchase and sale of horses takes on a
character all its own.
198. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403-06 (1987).
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